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Abstract
This paper attempts to answer the question of why major powers engage in more
active foreign policy behaviors than minor powers. It does so by comparing two ex-
planations for the increased conflict propensity of major powers. The first explanation
focuses on major powers’ observable capabilities, while the second stresses their dif-
ferent behavior. We incorporate both into an ultimatum model of conflict in which a
state’s cost of conflict consists of both observable and behavioral components. Using
data from the period from 1870 to 2001, we empirically illustrate the observable and
behavioral differences between major and minor powers. We then utilize a decompo-
sition model to assess the relative significance of the two explanations. The results
suggest that most of the difference in conflict propensity between major and minor
powers can be attributed to observable differences.
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For decades, scholars have claimed that major powers differed from minor powers. In
studies of topics as varied as international conflict, economic sanctions, nuclear proliferation,
alliance formation, and conflict mediation, major power status has been used as a control
variable. The assumption (either explicit or implicit) behind this choice is that major pow-
ers will more often engage in these foreign policy behaviors than would their minor power
counterparts. To adjust for the differences between major and minor powers, major power
status is a control variable that is used in many studies of international conflict (just to name
a few recent examples, Braumoeller and Carson 2011, Dafoe 2011, Kleinberg, Robinson and
French 2012). These studies generally agree that major powers are more conflict-prone than
minor powers and choose to account for their presence when studying conflict onset.
Most international relations research agrees that major powers are involved in more
conflict than other states, yet the question that remains is why major powers differ from minor
powers. In other words, what about the major powers makes them more likely to become
involved in a conflict than a minor power? In the international relations literature, there are
two primary explanations for this conflictual behavior. The first explanation focuses on the
observable characteristics of major powers. It stresses the fact that major powers have greater
material capabilities. These greater capabilities (such as more natural resources, higher
GDP, larger militaries) reduce major powers’ cost of engaging in conflict and allow them
greater opportunity to do so. Major powers are also able to participate in more meaningful
alliances and trade with more states, which again would make engaging in conflict less costly.
The second explanation is that major powers have a different “major power culture” and
an externally-focused definition of security that lead them to have wider interests. This
explanation suggests that major powers would behave differently from minor powers, even
under the same observable circumstances.
This paper incorporates both explanations into an ultimatum model of conflict in which a
state’s cost of conflict consists of both an observable and a behavioral component. To test the
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influence of both components on major powers’ conflict propensity, we conduct an empirical
analysis that compares the observable differences between major and minor powers for the
time period from 1870 to 2001. A decomposition model is used to determine how much
of major powers’ war proneness can be attributed to differences in the observable variables
relative to differences in behavior. The results suggest that most of the variation in conflict
propensity of major powers can be attributed to observable characteristics, and not their
behavior. This leads to a variety of implications on the “exceptionality” of major powers
and the study of conflict onset through a bargaining framework. It seems to be the case
that major powers’ more active international behavior is determined not by their culture or
by being perceived as “part of the club” by other major powers, but rather by their greater
capabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the lit-
erature on major powers and international conflict, and extract two types of explanations
for the observation that major powers are involved in more conflict than other states. The
first explanation highlights the observable characteristics of major powers, and the second
emphasizes the claim that major powers behave differently than other states. These expla-
nations for major power exceptionalism are formalized with an ultimatum bargaining model
that allows for the empirical implications of the two explanations to be separated. The
empirical section of the paper follows by describing the differences in observables (i.e., differ-
ences in national capabilities, trade, alliance membership, and democracy) and behavioral
differences (i.e., differences in coefficients for the observables). Next an empirical strategy for
determining the relative importance of the two explanations is developed and implemented.
The empirical results show that much of the difference in the rate of conflict between major
and minor powers can be attributed to differences in observable characteristics rather than
behavior. The manuscript concludes with an overview of the results and offers suggestions
for additional research that might expand upon the analysis here.
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Major Powers and International Relations
Quantitative studies of international relations typically utilize a country’s major power status
as a control variable. Studies on topics as varied as international conflict, economic sanctions,
military alliance, and international mediation differentiate major powers from other coun-
tries in their assessment of these behaviors. Perhaps not surprisingly, in almost all regression
models that include major power status as a control variable, the major power variable turns
out to be statistically significant. Major powers experience more international conflicts (e.g.,
Braumoeller and Carson 2011, Dafoe 2011, Kleinberg, Robinson and French 2012, Oneal
and Russett 2005, Reed, Clark, Nordstrom and Hwang 2008), impose more economic sanc-
tions (Lektzian and Souva 2003, Lektzian and Sprecher 2007), are more likely to have nu-
clear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007, Montgomery and Sagan 2009), form more military
alliances (Gibler and Wolford 2006, Gibler 2008), are more likely to mediate (Greig 2005)
or intervene in civil and international conflict (Kathman 2010, Kathman 2011). Overall,
major powers are more active internationally, engaging in more foreign policy behaviors
that influence the behavior of other states and the way in which the international system
functions.
While it is no doubt well established that major powers behave differently from minor
powers, we do not know as much about why it is that major powers play this more active
role in the international system. Is this simply because major powers have more resources
at their disposal that enable them to engage in more foreign policy actions? Or, is there
something special about major power states that would make these countries more war-prone
than other states?
What we call the “observables” perspective would explain these differences in foreign
policy behavior through tangible resources that are available to major powers. Put simply,
major powers have more resources at their disposal than do minor powers. More resources
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will give states the opportunity to be more active, and states will take the opportunity.
Palmer and Morgan (2006) discuss how states have a total budget that they can use to
produce more foreign policy. As states obtain more resources and this budget grows, they
will engage in more foreign policy actions in general. This holds true for every state in
the system, whether they are considered a major or minor power. Thus, as states have
more resources we should observe them fighting more wars, creating more alliances, and
imposing more economic sanctions, all for the simple reason that they have the capacity
to do so. It is assumed that states always want to engage in more foreign policy actions,
and so major powers are simply the states that have the means to engage in these actions.
This “observables” approach does not usually treat states as being either revisionist or
status quo oriented, or some states as having more global interests than others (Palmer
and Morgan 2006). Rather, states’ involvement in the international system is determined
by their means to do so, by their resources (Palmer and Morgan 2006, Clark, Nordstrom
and Reed 2008). Therefore, the difference in the rate of conflict between major and minor
powers can, for the most part, be attributed to the stark differences in capacity and the
ability to bring to bear their power globally. Once the observable differences between major
and minor powers have been “held constant,” one might expect relatively small differences
between states that are considered major powers and those that are not.
Many studies of international relations’ measurement of major power status reflects this
conceptual differentiation of major powers as states with more resources at their disposal.
Major power status is often conceptualized using the Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC), which is constructed using six indicators of national power that are intended to
reflect present and potential power: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military
expenditures, military personnel, total population and urban population (Bremer 1980).
Nations that rank higher on capability have been found to be involved in and initiate more
wars. Thus, the first possibility that we have considered is that major powers’ greater
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involvement in conflict is simply due to the fact that major powers have more resources,
making wars relatively less costly than for other states. While one would indeed expect
observable characteristics to influence how prone to war a state is, one might also have reasons
to believe that there is still some residual component to the difference in conflict propensities
between major and minor powers. That is, major powers may behave differently from minor
powers, even under similar circumstances (Rasler and Thompson 1985, Zakaria 1999). We
thus consider the second possibility that there is something about being a major power that
leads to behavioral differences across major and minor powers, resulting in different responses
to similar environmental conditions. This would be the portion of the difference between
major and minor powers that is left unexplained by standard “observables” approaches.
The notion that there are some residual, behavioral differences between major powers and
other states is also reflected in the operationalization of major power status in frequently-
used datasets. For example, the Correlates of War (COW) Project, in its State System
Membership List, makes the claim that observable capabilities alone are not sufficient for
categorizing a state as a major power. Rather, “states must behave as major powers, with
global interests and reach and must be regarded by the other major powers as ‘members of
the club’ ” (Correlates of War Project 2008). The basis of COW’s method for defining major
powers, accepted by many, is presented in Singer and Small (1972). Singer and Small (1972)
define major powers through what they refer to as “inter-coder agreement.” That is, major
powers are defined as those countries that the majority of coders agree are major powers.1
What are the characteristics of these particular nations, other than measurable factors, that
lead the coders to classify them as major powers?
Scholars have highlighted behavioral differences between major and minor powers that are
independent of measurable material capabilities (Wight 1978, Gulick 1955, Organski 1958,
1 The COW Project lists as major powers, in different time periods, the following nations: Austria-
Hungary, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the USSR/Russia.
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Mearsheimer 2001, Levy 1983). One plausible explanation for this residual difference is that
major powers have different goals than do minor powers. That is, major powers will be driven
to fight more wars, not only because they have greater capabilities to do so but also because
they have different goals that they want to achieve with their greater capabilities other than
to secure their own survival. This means that major power states would sometimes be willing
to engage in wars that are too costly for minor power counterparts. This argument can be
traced back to earlier work that theorized about the unique qualities of states considered
major powers and the difference between major power political behavior and the less rele-
vant political interactions of minor power states (Wight 1978, Gulick 1955, Organski 1958).
According to Wight (1978), major powers have wider (world-wide) interests than do mi-
nor powers, therefore “they wish to monopolize the right to create international conflict.”
Their leaders have inherently different agendas from those of minor powers (Lemke 2003).
Hegemons, according to Wight (1978), all aspire to some sort of global empire that can re-
constitute the world. In doing this, they will be more concerned with their relative standing
in the international system than minor powers would be, as only the leading major powers
are truly able to reconstitute the world to their liking (Rasler and Thompson 1985).
Other possible sources of the residual difference are cultural and/or cognitive differences.
Many of the countries that have been classified as great powers have been European. It
may be the case that the culture of these nations has made them more war-prone than
other nations under equivalent circumstances (Lemke 2002, Ayoob 1991). Beyond regional
and circumstantial differences, scholars have argued that there are distinct minor and ma-
jor power cultures that lead to the two groups behaving differently, even under the same
circumstances (Ayoob 1991). Moreover, Thomas (1987) argues that the concept of security
is not the same for major and minor powers. On the one hand, considering how secure
they are, major powers are primarily concerned about external threats. On the other hand,
minor powers will also take into account factors that are taken for granted by major powers,
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such as the internal security of the state and the provision of basic goods such as food and
health care (Thomas 1987). This means that major powers are more responsive to changes
in the external conditions that encourage states to fight, such as increases in their military
capabilities relative to other states. In contrast, minor powers are less responsive to such
conditions because they are more constrained in terms of their ability to take advantage of
military opportunities.
These two types of explanations, one based on observable characteristics and the other
based on behavioral heterogeneity, generate different expectations about the conflict propen-
sities of major and minor powers, which in turn have different implications for our under-
standing of international politics. If, as suggested by the “observables” perspective, the
difference between major powers and other states can be mostly attributed to differences
in observable factors such as national capabilities, etc., then we should expect that a mi-
nor power that has obtained more resources would begin to act more like a major power.
This means that the empirical findings obtained by analyzing major power behaviors can
be, at least in principle, generalized to explain the behaviors of those minor powers that
have gained sufficient resources. However, previous empirical studies that focus only on
major power behaviors are rather cautious about generalizing their theories and empirical
findings outside the major power behaviors. In fact, most of these studies carefully limit
their scope of generalizability to major powers, arguing that one must await future research
that directly analyzes minor power behaviors before one can begin to assess the generality
of their findings (e.g., Rasler and Thompson 2000). This cautious view on generalizability is
based partially on the perspective that there are important intangible differences in major
and minor powers’ goals, cultures, or views on security, which lead major powers to behave
differently than minor powers even under similar circumstances.
It is thus important to be able to disaggregate the effects of both the observable and
unobservable characteristics of major and minor powers. To distinguish between these two
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different categories of explanations, the remainder of the paper begins by introducing a simple
bargaining model of conflict that illustrates how observable and unobservable characteristics
associated with the cost of fighting influence the probability of conflict. The model allows
us to conceptually differentiate observable and behavioral explanations in a precise way.
Following the discussion of the bargaining model, we conduct a series of empirical analyses
to explore the relative importance of the two explanations.
Contrasting Observable and Behavioral Explanations
Bargaining theory has proved to be a powerful lens through which to view international
relations (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006). Below we introduce a simple bargaining model of
conflict that shows that the probability of conflict is a function of the costs of conflict.
Consistent with the “observables” perspective discussed above, we assume that major powers
incur lower costs of conflict than minor powers due to their superior military capabilities and
rich resources. Furthermore, consistent with the behavioral perspective, we also allow major
and minor power states to have different “saliency” parameters. This allows major and
minor power states to behave differently depending on their evaluation of the observable
cost of conflict. The model shows that major powers will experience a higher probability of
conflict because of their greater capabilities and lower sensitivity. This model also enables
us to differentiate the two perspectives in a precise way.
To sketch this dynamic out, consider the following ultimatum model adopted from Fearon
(1995). Two states, A and B, are in a dispute over the possession of a good worth 1 for
both sides. The proposer (A) makes a demand x ∈ [0, 1], which the responder (B) can either
accept or reject. If the demand is rejected by B, a violent conflict ensues where A and B
pay costs for fighting, cA, and cB, respectively. The proposer (A) wins the conflict with
probability p, and the responder (B) wins with the complementary probability 1 − p. If B
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accepts the demand, the payoffs are x for A and 1 − x for B. We first solve the complete
information version of the game via backwards induction. At the last node of the game, B
will accept any demand that gives B at least as much as 1− p− cB and will reject otherwise
because this is the amount B can get from fighting. Given this, A can maximize its payoff if it
makes the largest demand that B will accept. So, A’s optimal demand is the one that makes
B indifferent between accepting and rejecting, such that 1− x = 1− p− cB or x? = p+ cB.
In equilibrium, A demands x?, which B accepts. As long as both A and B are fully informed
about their own utilities and those of their rival, there will be no conflict in equilibrium. This
leads to the well-known result that because conflict is costly, there is always a negotiated
settlement that both A and B prefer to conflict.
However, if it is assumed that A does not know B’s costs of fighting, it can be shown
that major powers tend to make larger demands, which can result in a higher probability of
conflict. To illustrate this point, assume that cB is drawn from some continuous probabil-
ity distribution with the associated cumulative distribution function H(·) and the density
function h(·). Under this assumption B’s with cB < x? − p reject A’s demand and B’s with
cB ≥ x? − p accept A’s demand. Therefore, the ex ante probability of conflict is just the
probability that B rejects the demand, or Pr(cB < x − p) = H(x − p). Given this, we now
consider A’s optimal offer under uncertainty.
We assume that A’s cost of conflict cA consists of observable component c¯j and unobserv-
able behavioral component ζj, such that cA = ζM c¯M for major powers and cA = ζm c¯m for
minor powers. c¯j captures tangible resources such as military capabilities and resources avail-
able to the state. This component is multiplied by the saliency parameter ζj, which captures
how states respond to these observables. Consistent with the “observables” perspective, we
assume that major powers have greater material capabilities, richer resources, and are less
constrained by geography in deploying their forces abroad, so that c¯j is lower for major
powers than for minor powers, or c¯M < c¯m. To accommodate the behavioral perspective, we
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allow that ζM 6= ζm. That is, the behavioral perspective implies that major powers are, on
average, more willing to bear the cost of conflict than minor powers if they are put under
similar circumstances. Put differently, the cost of conflict is more salient for minor powers
than for major powers because minor powers have more narrowly defined goals and/or are
primarily concerned about internal security. Thus, the behavioral perspective suggests that
ζM  ζm whereas the “observables” perspective implies ζM ' ζm.
Using this information, the expected value function for any demand made by A can be
constructed:
V (x|Major) = H(x− p)(p− ζM c¯M) +
[
1−H(x− p)]x
V (x|Minor) = H(x− p)(p− ζmc¯m) +
[
1−H(x− p)]x
where H(x− p) is the ex ante probability of conflict. A’s optimal demand x? maximizes the
above expected value function. Assuming that cB is drawn from a uniform distribution with
a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound of 1, H(x) = x and h(x) = 1. Setting the derivative
of the expected value function equal to zero and solving for x? gives the optimal demand. If
A is a major power, this is
∂V (x|Major)
∂x
= 1−H(x− p) + h(x− p)(p− ζM c¯M − x) = 0
x? =
1
2
(1 + 2p− ζM c¯M).
Similarly, for a minor power, the optimal demand is x? = 1
2
(1 + 2p − ζmc¯m). Plugging this
optimal demand into the expression for the ex ante probability of conflict, we obtain the
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probability of conflict in equilibrium.
Pr(Conflict|Major)? = 1
2
(1− ζM c¯M) (1)
Pr(Conflict|Minor)? = 1
2
(1− ζmc¯m). (2)
Both the “observables” and the behavioral perspectives suggest that cA is smaller for major
powers, or ζM c¯M < ζmc¯m. This causes major powers to make larger demands. In addition, if
there is uncertainty about the cost of fighting, as illustrated above, major powers with lower
costs of fighting relative to other states will make larger demands that are more likely to be
rejected. Thus, both perspectives suggest that the probability of conflict is higher for major
powers than for minor powers. However, they differ sharply in terms of how much of this
difference is attributed to the difference in c¯j or the difference in ζj.
To illustrate this, the difference in probability of conflict between major and minor power
states is obtained by subtracting (2) from (1):
D ≡ Pr(Conflict|Major)? − Pr(Conflict|Minor)?
=
1
2
(1− ζM c¯M)− 1
2
(1− ζmc¯m)
= ζmc¯m − ζM c¯M .
Adding and subtracting ζmc¯M from the right-hand side of this and rearranging the terms,
we obtain
D = ζm(c¯m − c¯M) + (ζm − ζM)c¯M (3)
The “observables” perspective assumes that c¯M < c¯m and ζM ' ζm. Thus, the expectation
is that most of the difference in the rate of conflict between major and minor power states
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can be understood in terms of the differences in their observable characteristics rather than
the differences in how major and minor powers respond to similar circumstances. That is,
the first part of (3), ζm(c¯m − c¯M), should be much greater than the second part, (ζm −
ζM)c¯M . On the other hand, the behavioral perspective assumes that ζM  ζm, implying
that much of the difference is explained by the second part, or how responsive major and
minor power states are to the observable characteristics such as material capabilities. Now
that we have conceptually differentiated the observable and behavioral explanations, the goal
of the statistical analyses that follow is to empirically assess the relative importance of the
two explanations.
Empirical Analysis
We conduct a series of statistical analyses in three steps. As an empirical first cut, we
initially examine the differences between major powers and other states with respect to the
observable factors including national capabilities, trade, alliance membership, democracy,
and past dispute involvement. Following that, we also examine differences between major
powers and other states in terms of how these states respond to these observables (i.e.,
differences in coefficients). Finally, we introduce an empirical strategy that enables us to
determine the relative importance of the observable and behavioral differences.
An Empirical First Cut
The analyses use data that span the time frame of 1870–2001 and contain 10,736 obser-
vations. The full sample includes 789 major power country-years and 9,947 minor power
country-years. The outcome variable, MID Initiation, is recorded as 1 if the state initiated a
militarized interstate dispute (MID) against another state in the observation year; 0 other-
wise. To identify initiation of an MID, we focus on MIDs involving principal initiators and
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principal targets and exclude joiners. Data are from Maoz’s (2005) refined version of the
data. To differentiate between major and minor powers we use the COW Project’s classifi-
cation of major powers, where a coding of 1 reflects a major power and a 0 a minor power.
In addition, we include a set of variables known to correlate with militarized conflict. State
capability is measured using the state’s military capability score in the year, as operational-
ized by COW. We rescale this measure by multiplying the cinc score by 10. A state’s level
of democracy is recorded as 1 if the state has a democracy score greater than or equal to
6; 0 otherwise. We use the polity2 (Democracy minus Autocracy score) variable from the
Polity IV dataset. To measure the level of trade we use the natural logarithm of the sum
of the state’s exports and imports in a given year. Trade data are from the COW Project.
We also include a variable for the number of alliance partners a state had in a given year.
Alliance data are from the ATOP dataset. Finally, we include a variable for the number of
peace years that have passed since the last initiation of a MID by the state.
***Figure 1 About Here***
The primary empirical difference of interest between major powers and other states is the
significantly higher rate of conflict experienced by major powers. In Figure 1, the top-left
panel shows the observed rate of militarized conflict for major powers (to the left) and minor
powers (to the right). This difference in the rate of militarized conflict between major powers
and other states is recognized by most quantitative studies of international conflict. Many
studies justify their focus on major powers precisely because major powers are involved in
militarized conflict more often than other states. In fact, many of the minor powers are
never involved in any meaningful level of militarized conflict.
How much of this difference in conflict probability can be attributed to the observable
differences between major and minor powers, as suggested by the “observables” perspective?
To illustrate the differences in observable characteristics of major powers and other states,
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Figure 1 also shows the average differences between these two groups. In this figure, the
heights of the bars show the mean values of each variable for two samples: major power
states (to the left) and minor power states (to the right). Error bars on top of the rectangu-
lar bars show the 95 % confidence intervals for the mean estimates. We can see that there
are important and interesting differences between major powers and other states in terms
of observable variables that are found to correlate with militarized conflict. As mentioned
previously, major powers are involved in much more conflict than other states and, as ex-
pected, have much greater economic and military power that is indicated by the capability
variable. The political institutions in major powers are more democratic on average, and
major powers engage in more trade than do other states. Finally, major powers have more
alliance ties than other states, and they experience much shorter spans of peace than other
states.
These differences in observable correlates of conflict are largely consistent with the “ob-
servables” explanation for the difference in the rate of conflict between major power and other
states. Based on the distribution of these variables and the fact that there are many more
minor powers than major powers, major powers should be expected to make larger demands
and experience more conflict than other states because of their strong bargaining position
and optimism about the outcome of a militarized conflict. However, it is possible that there
are also important differences in ways that major and minor power states respond to these
observable correlates of conflict. For example, Reed and Chiba (2010) demonstrate that,
although there are important observable differences between contiguous and noncontiguous
dyads, much of the difference in their conflict propensity can be attributed to differences
in how neighbors and nonneighbors behave. Is it also the case that major powers behave
differently from minor powers, just as neighbors and nonneighbors behave differently? To
explore this question, we regress our outcome variable (conflict initiation) on the observable
covariates discussed above.
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***Table 1 About Here***
Table 1 shows the results of regression analyses on major and minor power states. These
logit coefficients show the estimated marginal changes in conflict propensities in response
to the changes in observable variables. To see how major powers differ from other states,
separate models are estimated for three samples: the sample of major power states (Model
1), sample of minor power states (Model 2), and the sample of all states (Model 3).2 In-
terestingly, all of the coefficients share the same sign across three models. Military capabil-
ities, trade, and alliance membership are all positively correlated with militarized conflict.
Democracy and spans of peace are negatively correlated with militarized conflict. However,
compared to other states, major powers appear to be less sensitive to the effect of democ-
racy and trade. This may be because there is more variation in democracy and trade in
the sample of minor powers. Most major powers are democratic and fully engaged in the
international political economy. In short, although there are interesting differences between
major powers and other states in terms of how they respond to observable factors, to a great
extent major powers and other states appear to respond to the observable factors described
in Figure 1 in a similar fashion.
***Figure 2 About Here***
Figure 2 shows the estimated mean probability of conflict for major powers relative
to other states. In this figure, kernel density plots (smoothed histograms) represent the
distribution of the expected probabilities of conflict obtained from two samples. 3
2 Running separate models for sub-samples of the data is mathematically equivalent to estimating the
pooled sample by interacting all the covariates with the variable that separates the sample (i.e., the Major
Power variable). In other words, logit coefficients reported under Models 1 and 2 are the implied coefficients
from such fully interacted model.
3 Uncertainty estimates are obtained by bootstrapping. That is, we first draw 1000 sets of samples from
major and minor power observations, respectively. We then estimate logit models shown in Table 1 for each
set, and obtain mean predicted probabilities for major and minor power observations. Plotted in Figure 2
are the 1000 values of the mean predicted probabilities for major and minor power observations.
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Decomposition Method
The analyses in the preceding section provide some evidence for the claim that the primary
difference between major powers and other states is caused by the distribution of observable
factors. That is, major powers are involved in more conflict because they are more powerful
than minor powers. However, there is also some evidence to support the claim that major
powers behave differently than do minor powers in addition to the descriptive differences in
observables. It is not yet clear how much of the gap in conflict probability between major
and minor powers is explained by the differences in observables relative to the behavioral
heterogeneity. This section outlines an empirical strategy that is able to do exactly this.
To determine the power of “observable” explanation relative to the behavioral expla-
nation, it must be determined how much of the difference is due to differences in ob-
servable characteristics between major and minor powers, and how much is due to dif-
ferences in the coefficients of separately estimated models of conflict for the major and
minor powers. A more precise definition of the quantities of interest is needed in order
to decompose these two effects. The microeconometrics literature on wage discrimina-
tion (Oaxaca 1971, Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 1973) offers a useful guide to decomposing these
effects. This literature attempts to decompose the wage gap between males and females into
differences in observable characteristics, such as education and experience, from behavioral
differences between the two groups.4 This research seeks to answer the following counterfac-
tual question: How would the distribution of wages look for women if they were operating
under the behavioral regime of males? That is, is the difference in wages caused by dif-
ferences in coefficients between the two groups or by differences in the values of observable
variables between the two groups?
This paper poses a similar question: How would the distribution of conflict look for
4 Recent applications of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition analysis in political science include Dow’s
(2009) analysis of the gender gap in political knowledge and Reed and Chiba’s (2010) analysis of the gap in
conflict probability between neighbors and nonneighbors.
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major powers if they were interacting under the behavioral regime of the less conflict-prone
sample of minor powers? Standard analyses assume that major and minor power dyads
respond identically to variables such as democracy, trade, and military capabilities. The
decomposition model to be described allows the responses to these other variables to differ
across the two groups. To answer the counterfactual question and to study the differences
between major and minor powers in a more flexible framework, the generalized decomposition
specification detailed in Fairlie (2005) is followed. Starting with the standard regression
model, where for major powers, j = majors, and for minor powers, j = minors:
Yj = Xjβj + j, E(j) = 0.
The mean outcome difference between the two groups is:
R = Y¯majors − Y¯minors = X¯majorsβˆmajors − X¯minorsβˆminors. (4)
This mean difference can be rewritten by adding and subtracting X¯majorsβˆminors from the
right-hand side and gathering the relevant terms together.
R =
[
(X¯majors − X¯minors)βˆminors︸ ︷︷ ︸ ]
Observables
+
[
X¯majors(βˆmajors − βˆminors)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ]
Behavior
. (5)
The first part of equation (5), “Observables,” is the difference in the conflict probabil-
ity between major and minor powers that can be explained by differences in measurable
variables. The difference between major and minor powers is illustrated in Figure 1. If no
differences existed between the two groups, X¯majors = X¯minors, all of the difference in the
conflict probability between major powers and minor power states would be attributed to
behavioral differences. However, the descriptive statistics in Figure 1 show this is not the
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case. Some of the difference in the conflict probability is explained by differences in the X’s
from each group, and the decomposition allows a specific statement to be provided about
the magnitude of this effect on the whole and for each observable variable.
The second part of equation (5) represents the difference in the conflict probability that
can be explained by behavioral differences between the two groups (i.e., differences in how
major and minor powers respond to values of the observable variables). This is simply the
difference in the logit coefficients shown in Table 1. The coefficients from the sample of
minor powers are used for the vector of benchmark coefficients drawn from the group that is
not expected to experience more conflict. This follows the convention in labor economics of
using the sample of males as the benchmark because this group is not expected to experience
wage discrimination. The coefficients from the sample of minor powers are used based on an
expectation that their conflict behavior will be unaffected by the behavioral effect of being
a major power.5 When βˆmajors = βˆminors, all of the difference in the conflict probability
between major and minor powers is a function of differences in observable variables. Again,
Table 1 shows that βˆmajors 6= βˆminors; the decomposition enables a precise statement to be
made about how differences in the coefficients between the two groups affect the difference
in the conflict probability. This method enables an assessment of the relative merit of both
explanations regarding the difference in the conflict probability between the two groups. This
decomposition is relatively straightforward in the context of least squares. However, a slight
modification is necessary to study these quantities of interest in the context of maximum
likelihood estimation (Jann 2006). Setting the superscripts for major powers to T and for
5 An alternative approach is to use the coefficients from the pooled model as the benchmark (Oaxaca and
Ransom 1994, Neumark 1988). The decomposition equation (5) for such specification is written as
R =
[
(X¯majors − X¯minors)βˆpooled︸ ︷︷ ︸ ]
Observables
+
[
X¯majors(βˆmajors − βˆpooled)− X¯minors(βˆminors − βˆpooled)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ]
Behavior
.
(6)
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minor powers to C, the nonlinear transformation is (Fairlie 2005):
R =
[
NT∑
i=1
F (XTi βˆ
C)
NT
−
NC∑
i=1
F (XCi βˆ
C)
NC
]
+
[
NT∑
i=1
F (XTi βˆ
T )
NT
−
NT∑
i=1
F (XTi βˆ
C)
NT
]
, (7)
where, F (·) is the logit link function and N is the number of observations in each sample.6
Decomposition Results
The aggregate results of the decomposition analysis are shown in Figure 3. The dark kernel
density function to the right of the figure shows the mean probability of conflict for major
powers, or Y¯majors = X¯majorsβˆmajors in equation (4).
7 To the far left of the figure is the
kernel density function that shows the probability of conflict for the average minor power, or
Y¯minors = X¯minorsβˆminors in equation (4). These are the same two density functions shown
in Figure 2.
*** Figure 3 About Here ***
The goal of the decomposition analysis is to understand the gap between these two den-
sity functions in terms of observable variables and responses to changes in the observable
factors. To this end, the kernel density in between the major and minor power kernel densi-
ties is a counterfactual kernel density function. This counterfactual density is calculated by
matching the observable characteristics of the major power states (X¯majors) with the behav-
ioral characteristics of the minor power states (βˆminors).
8 Put differently, the counterfactual
density function represents states that have the average observable characteristics of major
6 Technically, it is necessary for the two groups to have the same number of observations. Following
convention, this is accomplished by sampling observations from the group with the larger number of ob-
servations in the data to match the number of observations in the smaller group. See the appendix for a
description of the exact procedure we use.
7 Since this is a non-linear model, a more technically accurate expression is Y¯majors =
∑ F (Xmajorsβˆmajors)
N
8 We follow the bootstrapping procedure described in footnote 3 to calculate uncertainty estimates for
the counterfactual probabilities.
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powers but behave like minor powers. Notice that the counterfactual X¯majorsβˆminors is pre-
cisely the quantity that we added and subtracted from equation (4) in order to decompose
the difference in conflict probability as shown in equation (5). In this sense, Figure 3 is a
graphical representation of equation (5).
The difference between the major power density X¯majorsβˆmajors and the counterfactual
density X¯majorsβˆminors is labeled the “Behavioral Effect” in the figure because X¯majorsβˆmajors−
X¯majorsβˆminors = X¯majors(βˆmajors − βˆminors), which is precisely the second part of equation
(5). This difference represents the portion of the gap in the rate of conflict between major
powers and other states that can be explained by different responses to similar environmen-
tal situations. Comparing the major power density function with the counterfactual density
function, we can see that if the average major power were to respond to changes in observable
variables as if it were a minor power, the probability of conflict would be lower. However,
the difference in how major powers respond to changes in observable factors does not seem
to be especially strong. In fact, the reduction in the probability of conflict is from 0.478 to
0.407. This is merely 19.7 % (' 0.478−0.407
0.478−0.121) of the gap in conflict between the two groups.
On the other hand, the difference between the counterfactual density X¯majorsβˆminors
and the minor power density X¯minorsβˆminors is labeled the “Observable Effect” in the figure
because this difference is X¯majorsβˆminors − X¯minorsβˆminors = (X¯majors − X¯minors)βˆminors,
which is just the first part of equation (5). This is the portion of the gap in the rate of
conflict that can be explained by differences in average observable variables (e.g., military
capabilities, democracy, trade, etc). This effect is much larger than the “Behavioral Effect.”
Changing a minor power’s observable factors to reflect the average major power increases
the probability of conflict from 0.121 to 0.407. This amounts to 80.3 % (' 0.407−0.121
0.478−0.121) of
the gap in conflict between the two groups. Put differently, the effect of this change in
observable variables results in almost a 236 % (= 0.407−0.121
0.121
) increase in the probability of
conflict, compared to about a 15% (= 0.407−0.478
0.478
) decrease in the probability of conflict that
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is associated with major powers behaving as if they were minor powers.9
Besides describing the aggregate differences in the probability of conflict between major
powers, other states, and the counterfactual states, it is also possible to calculate the explana-
tory power of each independent variable. The goal of this analysis is to further disaggregate
the aggregate “observable” effect (80.3% of the gap) into individual contributions by each
covariate. We follow Fairlie’s (2005) generalization of the nonlinear decomposition method
that extends the Blinder–Oaxaca linear decomposition analysis (Oaxaca 1971, Oaxaca 1973,
Blinder 1973). 10
*** Figure 4 About Here ***
*** Table 2 About Here ***
Figure 4 reports these results. Solid circles show the estimated contributions from the
explanatory variables expressed as percentage points, and the horizontal line segments asso-
ciated with them show the 95 % confidence interval of the estimates. In other words, each
estimate shows the percentage of the gap in the conflict probability that can be attributed
to each observable variable. Positive estimates suggest that the variable has a positive con-
tribution to the gap, meaning that increases in the value of the observable variable increase
the gap in the probability of conflict. On the other hand, observable variables with negative
estimates decrease the gap. Note that if we add up all the individual contributions, the re-
sult is 80.3 %, which corresponds to the “observable” effect discussed above. The remaining
gap in the probability of conflict (19.7%) is attributed to the behavioral difference between
major and minor power states.
9 As a robustness check, we also performed a decomposition analysis using the pooled coefficients as the
benchmark (See equation (6) in footnote 5). The results suggest that 89 % of the gap is attributed to the
observables and 11 % is behavioral, lending greater support for the “observables” perspective. The results
are included in the replication package.
10 Since the logit model is a nonlinear model, we can no longer use X¯ to calculate the counterfactual for
each covariate. Instead, we calculate Xiβˆ for each observation in the sample and aggregate them to obtain∑N
i Xiβˆ. We iterate this process 1,000 times to approximate the nonlinear model equivalent of X¯βˆ. See
Appendix for more details.
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Individual contributions differ interestingly both in size and in magnitude. The observ-
able variables contributing the most to the gap in the conflict rate between the two groups are
those that measure military capabilities, whereas the difference in the average years of peace
also explains a substantial amount of the gap. Variables measuring trade and alliances also
make positive contributions to the gap. On the other hand, the contribution of democracy
is negative, suggesting that democracy decreases the probability difference between major
and minor power states. It is useful to illustrate how we calculate these quantities in the
context of linear models and to discuss the interpretation of the effects of the variables.
To obtain individual contribution for a variable x in linear models, we first take the
difference between the average value of the variable in the major power sample and the
average value in the minor power sample, x¯majors − x¯minors, and then multiply this difference
by the benchmark coefficient (i.e., coefficient from minor power sample), βminors. Therefore,
when a variable exhibits a positive contribution it is because the signs of βminors and x¯majors−
x¯minors are the same. If the variable exhibits a negative contribution, it is because the signs
of βminors and x¯majors − x¯minors are different.11 For example, the contributions of capabilities,
trade, and alliances are positive because major powers are both more likely to have greater
capabilities, levels of trade, and alliances, and these variables are positively correlated with
militarized conflict in this sample. The contribution of peace years is positive because major
powers have shorter spans of peace that are negatively correlated with militarized conflict.
On the other hand, the contribution of democracy is negative because major powers are
more democratic than minor powers, on average, and democracy is negatively correlated
with conflict.
11 In the context of nonlinear models, the marginal effect of one covariate depends on the values of the
other covariates. For this reason, calculations of the individual contribution cannot rely on the average value
of x but rather use the actual values while controlling for the other covariates at the observed values. See
the appendix for the detail.
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Percentage contributions reported in Figure 4 and the last column of Table 2 are obtained
by dividing the individual contribution for each variable by the raw difference (0.356) in
conflict probabilities between major and minor powers. As we see, the observable variables
contributing the most to the gap in the conflict rate between the two groups are those that
measure military capabilities and the years of peace.
Discussion and Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to study the difference between major powers and other states in
terms of their conflict behavior and to use these results to make an evidence-based statement
about the differences between major and minor powers. In addition, the results from this
manuscript provide some evidence about the ability of bargaining theory to explain how
major powers and hegemonic states may differ from minor powers. The empirical evidence
strongly suggests that most of the difference in the rate of conflict between major powers
and other states is due to differences in observable variables between the two groups such
as military capabilities, democracy, alliance membership, trade, and spans of peace. In
terms of generalizability, this is good news for studies that limit their data to a sample of
major powers. Although variables typically associated with militarized conflict have different
relative effects in the two groups (i.e., major powers and other states), the direction of
the effects is consistent across groups. This means that insomuch as unobservable factors
correlate in the same way that these observable factors do with conflict onset, the results
from papers that focus only on major powers can be expected to be generally similar to
results in a sample of all states or just minor powers. Since the explanatory variables in the
sample of major powers have similar effects in a sample of minor powers, choosing major
powers as the criteria of case selection amounts to selecting observations based on a value of
an independent variable that is uncorrelated with unmeasured factors (i.e., the error term).
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The tendency for major powers and other states to have similar responses to changes
in observable factors has some interesting theoretical implications as well. The analysis
here is supportive of the claim that there are general dynamics that can lead to the onset
of militarized conflict and that these dynamics hold across heterogenous units. Moreover,
these results from the empirical analysis are consistent with the logic of bargaining theory.
Variables that might make a state optimistic and willing to make larger demands, such as
military capabilities and alliances, are positively correlated with major powers and conflict
onset. There is some evidence here for major powers making larger demands because of their
favorable bargaining position relative to other states. Moreover, major powers are unlikely
to back down when their demands are unmet. This relative imbalance in resolve, favoring
major powers, is consistent with the imbalance of observable variables between major powers
and other states.
Overall, the empirical evidence seems to support the dynamic sketched out in the bar-
gaining model. There does not appear to be anything exceptional about major powers aside
from the fact that major powers have more capacity to become involved in international
interactions and tend to have greater bargaining leverage. Despite the fact that previous
research posits that being a major power contains an intangible, behavioral element that
goes beyond capabilities, it appears to be the case that if there is such an effect, it is rather
small.
The results point to an interesting similarity between measures of political relevance
and major power status. Insomuch as measures of political relevance attempt to capture a
latent capacity to become involved in international interactions these measures are similar
to the major power status. One can think about political relevance as selecting on a positive
value of an unmeasured variable one might call “capacity.” Likewise, major power status
also selects on positive values of “capacity.” Based on this logic, results from studies using
politically relevant dyads and studies using major powers should both generalize to other
25
samples of all dyads and all states.
Finally, the results show that while scholars may often conceptualize major powers as
states that have global agendas and are willing to interact differently from other states in the
system, in actuality this behavior is simply determined by the capacity of states to behave
in this more active manner. That is to say, the bargaining behavior of states is not defined
by whether others see them as “part of the club” or whether they are innately more globally
engaged. Rather, their bargaining behavior will change to look more like the behavior
associated with major powers (making larger demands, being more likely to become involved
in conflict) as their observable variables (such as capabilities) change. Future research may
carefully explore the differences between major powers and other states in terms of their
expected and observed bargaining behavior.
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Table 1: Estimated Logit Coefficients:DV = MID Initiation, 1870–2001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Major Powers Minor Powers Pooled
Major Power 0.450∗∗∗
(0.123)
Capability 0.546∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.158) (0.093)
Democracy −0.346† −0.403∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.083) (0.075)
Log Trade 0.036 0.111∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.016) (0.015)
N(Alliance) 0.044∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009)
Peace Years −0.273∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.013) (0.013)
Peace Years2 0.015∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Peace Years3 −0.0002† −0.00005∗∗∗ −0.00005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.000006) (0.00006)
Intercept −0.738∗ −1.813∗∗∗ −1.764∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.110) (0.105)
N 789 9947 10736
Log likelihood −499 −3285 −3787
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table 2: Nonlinear Decomposition: Individual Contributionsa
Individual Percentage
Contribution Contribution
Variable (Std. Error)
Capability 0.128∗∗∗ 35.8 %
(0.029)
Democracy −0.012∗∗∗ −3.4 %
(0.003)
Trade 0.037∗∗∗ 10.3 %
(0.005)
N(Alliance) 0.024∗ 6.8 %
(0.010)
Peace Yearsb 0.110∗∗∗ 30.9 %
(0.006)
Difference in the rate of conflict (R) 0.356
Difference Attributable to Observables (RO) 0.286 80.3 %
Difference Attributable to Behavior (RB) 0.071 19.7 %
Sample Size of the Reference Group (Minor-power countries) 9,947
a This is a nonlinear decomposition of the observable and behavioral effects of major power on
militarized conflict. Minor-power sample is used as a benchmark group in decomposition.
b Cubic polynomials are also included in the model. Reported contributions for Peace Years
are the total contribution from the Peace Years variable and its square and cubic terms.
† significant at ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Figure 1: Differences in Observable Variables
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In each panel, mean values are shown for two sub-samples: major power observations (to
the left, n = 789) and minor power observations (to the right, n = 9, 947). The error bars
on top of the rectangular bars show the 95 % confidence intervals of the mean values.
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Figure 2: Densities for the Conflict Probability
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This figure shows the density plot (smoothed histogram) of predicted probabilities of conflict
initiation in the two samples. The horizontal axis shows the predicted probability of conflict
initiation, and the vertical axis shows the density estimates for the major power sample
(to the right) and the minor power sample (to the left). Each of the two densities in the
figure is centered around the observed rate of conflict for major (0.478) and minor power
(0.121) samples, respectively. The difference between the means is 0.356, which is statistically
significant, with a p-value of < 1e− 15. See footnote 3 for further details.
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Figure 3: Nonlinear Decomposition of Observable and Behavioral Effects
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This figure shows the density plot (smoothed histogram) that illustrates the decomposition
analysis. The two density estimates plotted on the left and right sides replicate the density
estimate shown in Figure 2. The gray density in the middle, which has a mean value of
0.407, shows the counterfactual conflict probability for country-years with observable char-
acteristics of major powers and behavioral characteristics of minor powers. The difference in
probabilities between the counterfactual and the minor power sample is 0.286 , which corre-
sponds to the observable effect (80.3% of the gap). The difference in probabilities between
the counterfactual and the major power sample is 0.071, which corresponds to the behavioral
effect (19.7% of the gap).
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Figure 4: Nonlinear Decomposition: Individual Contributions
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This graph presents the results of the nonlinear decomposition of major power and minor
power states shown in Table 2. Individual contributions from explanatory variables are
shown with circles (point estimates) and horizontal lines (95% confidence intervals). Total
contributions from the observable variables are obtained by summing all the individual con-
tributions, which yields 80.3% with a confidence interval of (61.4%, 98.9%). The remaining
difference in the outcome differential (19.7% of the gap) is attributed to the behavioral effect.
Standard errors are approximated with the delta method.
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Appendix: Nonlinear decomposition procedure
In this section we explain the procedure to perform a nonlinear decomposition analysis based
on simulation. We use this procedure to calculate individual contributions of each covariate
that are shown in Table 2. Once we have individual contributions, the observable effect is
obtained by summing up the contributions of all the covariates in the model. Then, the
behavioral effect is obtained by subtracting the observable effect from the raw difference in
conflict probabilities between major and minor power samples. The procedure we describe
here is based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method for linear models and Fairlie’s
(2005) generalization for nonlinear models.
The Set-up
Suppose there are three covariates of interests, X1, X2, and X3, that explain the outcome
variable, militarized conflict. Using the logit link function, the probability of militarized
conflict for the ith observation, Yi is given as:
Yi = F (β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i) (8)
where F is the logit CDF, β0 is the intercept, and βm is the coefficient parameter for Xm.
Using the matrix notation, the right hand side of (8) is expressed as F (Xiβ) where Xi =
{1, X1i, X2i, X3i} and βi = {β0, β1, β2, β3}.
The data are divided into two samples, T (major powers) and C (minor powers). The
number of observations for each sample is NT and NC , respectively. As shown in the first
part of equation (7), the aggregate observable effect, RO, is
NT∑
i=1
F (XTi βˆ
C)
NT
−
NC∑
i=1
F (XCi βˆ
C)
NC
≡ RO,
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where βˆCm is a vector of estimated benchmark coefficients.
12 In the scalar representation,
this is
RO =
NT∑
i=1
F (βˆC0 + βˆ
C
1 X
T
1i + βˆ
C
2 X
T
2i + βˆ
C
3 X
T
3i)
NT
−
NC∑
i=1
F (βˆC0 + βˆ
C
1 X
C
1i + βˆ
C
2 X
C
2i + βˆ
C
3 X
C
3i)
NC
.
Put differently, the aggregate observable effect, RO, is the portion of the probability difference
R that is attributed to observable covariates, X1, X2, andX3. Our goal here is to disaggregate
this further and determine how much ofRO is attributed to each of the threeXm’s. In order to
calculate the contribution of X1, for example, we take the difference between
∑ F (·)
N
evaluated
with βˆC1 X
T
1 and
∑ F (·)
N
evaluated with βˆC1 X
C
1 while holding βˆ2X2 and βˆ3X3 constant. The
challenge is that, in nonlinear models, the marginal change in
∑ F (·)
N
due to a change in
Xm depends on the values of the other covariates. We circumvent this issue by calculating∑ F (βˆCmXTm, X−mβˆ−m)
N
−∑ F (βˆCmXCm, X−mβˆ−m)
N
for all the observed values of X−m. Another issue
is that the number of observations is different for the two samples (NT < NC). This issue is
addressed by sampling (with replacement) observations from the smaller group (T ) so that
we have equal number of observations for the two samples. To adjust for the sampling error,
we iterate this procedure a sufficiently large number of times.
Each round of iteration consists of two steps: (1) drawing a random sample from the
smaller group, and (2) calculating
∑ F (βˆCmXTm, X−mβˆ−m)
N
−∑ F (βˆCmXCm, X−mβˆ−m)
N
for each obser-
vation and for each covariate. We explain these two steps below.
Step 1: Sampling from T group
In each iteration of the simulation, we first draw a random sample from the smaller group
(T ) with replacement, while using all the observations in the larger group (C). Then the
sampled observations in the T group are matched with the C group. The resulting data set
12 We use the minor power sample as the benchmark group for reasons discussed in the text.
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looks like the following.
Observation C group T group
1 XC11 X
C
21 X
C
31 X
T
11 X
T
21 X
T
31
2 XC12 X
C
22 X
C
32 X
T
12 X
T
22 X
T
32
3 XC13 X
C
23 X
C
33 X
T
13 X
T
23 X
T
33
...
...
...
i XC1i X
C
2i X
C
3i X
T
1i X
T
2i X
T
3i
...
...
...
NC XC1NC X
C
2NC X
C
3NC X
T
1NC X
T
2NC X
T
3NC
In each row, we have observations from the C group (XC1i, X
C
2i, X
C
3i for the ith row) paired
with the observations randomly sampled from the T group (XT1i, X
T
2i, X
T
3i for the ith row).
Each iteration of simulation generates slightly different results because of the differences in
pairing of observations from both groups. We smooth out the differences by taking the mean
value of all iterations.
Step 2: Calculating individual contributions
For the sampled observations, we calculate the following quantities in order to obtain the
individual contributions:
RO1 =
1
NC
NC∑
i=1
[
F (βˆC0 + βˆ
C
1 X
T
1i + βˆ
C
2 X
C
2i + βˆ
C
3 X
C
3i)− F (βˆC0 + βˆC1 XC1i + βˆC2 XC2i + βˆC3 XC3i)
]
(9)
RO2 =
1
NC
NC∑
i=1
[
F (βˆC0 + βˆ
C
1 X
T
1i + βˆ
C
2 X
T
2i + βˆ
C
3 X
C
3i)− F (βˆC0 + βˆC1 XT1i + βˆC2 XC2i + βˆC3 XC3i)
]
(10)
RO3 =
1
NC
NC∑
i=1
[
F (βˆC0 + βˆ
C
1 X
T
1i + βˆ
C
2 X
T
2i + βˆ
C
3 X
T
3i)− F (βˆC0 + βˆC1 XT1i + βˆC2 XT2i + βˆC3 XC3i)
]
,
(11)
38
where ROm is the portion of RO that is attributed to the observable covariate Xm.
In equation (9), notice that the only difference between the first F (·) and the second
F (·) is the underlined terms, βˆC1 XT1i and βˆC1 XC1i. Notice also that the second F (·) is precisely
the predicted probability of conflict for the ith observation in the C group. The first F (·)
in (9) represents the counterfactual probability of conflict for the ith observation in the T
group. That is, we replace XC1i with X
T
1i in the second term to obtain the first term. Then,
the difference between the first F (·) and the second F (·) is the observable effect that is
attributed to covariate X1 for the ith observation. RO1, or the individual contribution of X1,
is the mean difference of the first and the second F (·) for all the observations. In equation
(10), observe that the first F (·) in (9) becomes the second F (·) in (10). Then, to obtain the
first F (·) in (10), we replace XC2i with XT2i in the second F (·). Likewise, the first F (·) in (10)
becomes the second F (·) in (11), and the first F (·) in (11) is obtained by replacing XC3i with
XT3i.
It can be seen from equations (9)–(11) that the estimates of individual contributions
can be sensitive to the orderings of the covariates. The contribution of X2 is calculated by
utilizing the “leftover” from the calculation of X1, and the contribution of X3 is calculated by
utilizing the “leftover” from the calculations of X1 and X2. If we calculate the contributions
of X1, X2, and X3 in different orders, the results may differ. This is because, in nonlinear
models, the marginal changes in F (·) due to Xm depend on the values of the other covariates.
We circumvent this problem by randomizing the ordering of the covariates in each iteration
of the simulations, approximating the mean estimates from all possible orderings.
Summarizing the quantities of interests
The results reported in this paper are based on 1,000 simulations. The point estimates
reported in Table 2 are obtained by taking the mean of the estimates from the 1,000 repli-
cations. Uncertainty estimates can be obtained either by a linear approximation (the delta
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method), or by the quasi-Bayesian simulation methods. The delta method is computationally
less demanding, though it requires a stronger distributional assumption. The quasi-Bayesian
computation is more flexible (i.e., it does not rely on the linear additivity assumption), but it
is computationally more expensive. For the quasi-Bayesian computation of the uncertainty
estimates, we use 1,000 simulated βCk drawn from the multivariate Normal distribution (King,
Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). In our particular example, both methods lead to identical in-
ference.
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